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[Crim. No. 9319. In Bank. Nov. 5, 1965] 
In re JOE STERLING et al. on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Rabeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence.-Defendants who were 
convicted in a municipal court of gambling could not, in the 
absence of extraordinary circumstances, collaterally attack the 
judgment against them on the ground that evidence was un-
constitutionally obtained and that its introduction at their 
trial denied them due process of law, despite the fact that, 
though all remedies at trial and on appeal were exercised, 
direct review terminated in the appellate department of the 
superior court, where the search and seizure issue was fully 
tried, and the state's trial and appellate procedure was fully 
adequate to meet procedural requirements for adjudication 
of federal constitutional rights and to provide a record ade-
quate for federal habeas corpus review. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ discharged and petitioners remanded to the 
custody of the Los Angeles Municipal Court. 
'Valter L. Gordon, Jr., for Petitioners. 
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence R. Sperber as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners. 
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, Assistant 
City Attorney, William E. Doran, James H. Kline and Wil-
liam R. Yates, Deputy City Attorneys, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted in the Los 
Angeles Municipal Court of gambling in violation of section 
330 of the Penal Code. The People's case was submitted 
[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 34; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus 
(1st ed § 53). 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 26. 
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solely on the arrest reports, and it was stipulated that peti-
tioners would adduce no evidence other than that tending to 
show an illegal search and seizure. The search and seizure 
issue was fully tried. The court ruled that there was no 
illegality and found petitioners guilty as charged. The appel-
late department of the superior court affirmed the judgment, 
denied· a rehearing, and refused to certify the case to the 
District Court of Appeal. In the absence of certification or 
a published opinion, no further appeal was authorized by the 
California Rules of Court. (Rule 62(a).) 
[1] In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioners attack 
the judgment collaterally on the ground that evidence was 
unconstitutionally obtained and that its introduction at their 
trial denied them due process of law. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 
367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 
933] .) 
In In re Shipp (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 547 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399 
P.2d 571], and In re Lessard (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 497 [42 Cal. 
Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39], this court adopted the rule urged 
in the concurring opinion in In re Harris (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 
879, 880 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305], that habeas corpus 
is not available to challenge the use of evidence obtained by 
an unconstitutional search and seizure. We held that the 
availability of collateral attack to challenge violations of 
constitutional rights must be considered in light of the rele-
vance of the violation to the correct determination of peti-
tioner's guilt, the purpose of the constitutional principle in-
volved, and the effect that granting the remedy would have 
on the administration of criminal justice. "If the violation 
of a petitioner's constitutional rights by the use of illegally 
seized evidence had any bearing on the issue of his guilt, 
there should be no doubt that habeas corpus would be avail-
able. Unlike the denial of the right to counsel, the knowing 
use of perjured testimony or suppression of evidence, the use 
of an iuvoluntary confession, or as in this case, the denial 
of an opportunity to present a defense, the use of illegally 
seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting an in-
nocent person. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not 
to prevent the conviction of the innocent, but to deter uncon-
stitutional methods of law enforcement. [Citations.] That 
purpose is adequately served when a state provides an orderly 
procedure for raising the question of illegally obtained evi-
dence at or before trial and on appeal. The risk that the 
deterrent effect of the rule will be compromised by an occa-
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sional erroneous decision refusing to apply it is far out-
weighed by the disruption of the orderly administration of 
justice that would ensue if the issue could be relitigated over 
and over again on collateral attack." (In re Harris, supra, 
56 Ca1.2d at 883-884.) 
Petitioners contend, however, that the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381 
U.S. 618 [85 S.Ct.1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601] (see also Henry v. 
Mississippi (1965) 379 U.S. 443, 452-453 [85 8. Ct. 564, 13 
L.Ed.2d 408]) has now established that habeas corpus is an 
available remedy in the federal courts to challenge illegal 
searches or seizures in cases arising after the decision in M app 
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, and that we should therefore 
afford them a cognate collateral remedy in the state court~ 
We fully recognize this state's obligation to afford every 
defendant a full and fair opportunity to secure an adjudica-
tion of all claimed deprivations of his constitutional rights in 
the securing of the evidence ()ffered against him at trial. We 
believe, however, that in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances, the time and place to secure such an adjudication is 
at the trial and on appeal. Unless these direct remedies were 
inadequate for reasons for which the defendant was not re-
sponsible (see In re Spencer (1965) ante, pp. 400, 406 [46 
Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33]), we see no basis for affording 
him an opportunity to relitigate an alleged violation of such 
constitutional rights by collateral attack in the state courts. 
California's trial and appellate procedure is fully adequate 
to meet the procedural requirements recommended by the 
United States Supreme Court for the adjudication of federal 
constitutional rights and to provide a record adequate for 
federal habeas corpus review. (See Townsend v. Sain (1963) 
372 U.S. 293 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770) ; Case v. Nebraska 
(1965) 381 U.S. 336, 340 [85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422) 
[concurring opinion by Brennan, J.).) The right to counsel 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 686, subd. 2; Gideon v. 
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [83 8.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 
799,93 .A..L.R.2d 733), the right to liberal pretrial discovery 
(see cases collected in Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 
Cal.2d 56, 58-60 [22 Cal.Uptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 
1213), the right to compel the prosecution to establish the 
legality of a warrantless search or seizure merely by object-
ing to the introduction of the offered evidence (People v. 
Bllrl.·e (1964) 61 CaI.2d 575, 578 [39 CaI.Rptr. 531, 394 P.2d 
67] ; People v. Shelton (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 740, 744 [36 Cal. 
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Rptr. 433, 388 P.2d 665]), and the right to object to the 
introduction of illegally obtained evidence even if the con-
stitutional right invaded was that of a third person (People 
v. Jfartin (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 755 [290 P.2d 855]) insure full 
presentation of any claimed constitutional violation at the 
trial level. The right to appeal (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, 1466, 
subd. 2), the right to secure an adequate record on appeal (In 
re Paiva (1948) 31 Ca1.2d 503, 508 [190 P.2d 604] ; People 
v. Smith (1949) 34 Cal.2d449, 453 [211 P.2d 561]; In re 
Henderson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 541 [39 Cal.Rptr. 373, 393 P.2d 
685]), and the right to counsel on appeal (Douglas V. Cali-
fornia (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811]) 
insure full opportunity to secure appellate review. 
Failure to exercise these readily available remedies will 
ordinarily constitute such a deliberate bypassiilg of orderly 
state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well as state 
collateral relief. (Fay V. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438-439 
[83 8.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837].) Pursuit of these remedies 
will give a defendant a full adjudication of his claim and also 
lay the groundwork for immediate federal review. Under 
these circumstances, to authorize additional state collateral 
remedies would result only in needless repetition and delay. 
We have recognized the need to accommodate the state system 
to the existence of a federal collateral remedy (In re Shipp, 
supra, 62 Ca1.2d at pp. 554-555), but such accommodation 
does not require the abandonment of procedures vital to the 
orderly administration of justice by the state courts. Preserva-
tion of a defendant's constitutional rights lies not in mUltiple 
state remedies that will ordinarily produce the same result, 
but in one effective state remedy plus an awareness on the 
part of all state officials that ultimate federal review is avail-
able. We expedite the availability of that federal remedy 
by the compilation of a full and adequate record and by in-
sisting that one state remedy is ordinarily enough. 
Petitioners contend, however, that an exception should be 
recognized when all remedies at trial and on appeal are exer-
cised, but direc~ review terminates in the appellate depart-
ment of the superior court. Direct review in· petitioners' case 
terminated in that court owing to the orderly regulation of the 
courts' business pursuant to rules based on the seriousness 
of the crime involved. Such regulation should not be compro-
mised by special rules to afford further review beyond the 
appellate department in the absence of compelling reasons. 
There are no such reasons here. Petitioners have been con-
._) 
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victed on reliable, albeit allegedly unconstitutionally obtained, 
evidence. They have been afforded a full trial and appellate 
review of their constitutional claims pursuant to substantially 
the same standards that would apply had they been subject to 
trial in the superior court rather than the municipal court. 
To permit further review on habeas corpus of the legality of 
the search and seizure would afford them more remedies than 
are available to those charged with more serious crimes, and 
such further review could be justified only on the impermis-
sible assumption that the municipal courts and the appellate 
departments of the superior courts cannot be trusted to dis-
charge their duty to enforce the Constitution. 
The writ of habeas corpus is discharged and petitioners are 
remanded to the custody of the Los Angeles Municipal Court 
for the execution of sentence. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and 
Burke, J., concurred. 
[L.A. No. 28499. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1965.] 
R. G. GREYDANUS et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL 
ACCIDENT COMMISSION and DOMINIQUE BAS-
TERRETCHE, Respondents. 
[la, Ib] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Injur-
ies Received While Entering Employer's Premises.-A dairy 
employee who was required as a part of his joh each day to 
turn left off a highway into his employer's dairy farm to get 
to his work in the milking harn was exposed to a particular 
risk not shared hy the public generally and thus was entitled 
to workmen's compensation benefits for injuries sustained 
when, in making such turn, his vehicle was struck by a truck 
attempting to pass him on the left and, at the time of the 
impact, he had completed his turn and his vehicle was headed 
directly toward the harn. 
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Going to and Coming From Work. 
-Generally, employees are not covered by workmen's compen-
[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 83; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation (1st ed § 217). 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 102; 
[2) Workmen's Compensation, § 98; [3] Workmen's Compensation, 
§ 9. 
